Physical document verification is a necessary task in the process of reviewing applications for a variety of services, such as loans, insurance, and mortgages. This process consumes a large amount of time, money, and human resources, which leads to limited business throughput. Furthermore, physical document verification poses a critical risk to clients' personal information, as they are required to provide sensitive details and documents to verify their information. In this paper, we present a systematic approach to address shortcomings in the current state of the processes used for physical document verification. Our solution leverages a semi-trusted party data source (i.e. a governmental agency) and cryptographic protocols to provide a secure digital service. We make use of homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party computation to develop a series of protocols for private integer comparison and (non-) membership testing. Secure boolean evaluation and secure result aggregation schemes are proposed to combine the results of the evaluation of multiple predicates and produce the final outcome of the verification process. We also discuss possible improvements and other applications of the proposed secure system of protocols. Our framework not only provides a cost-efficient and secure solution for document verification, but also creates space for a new service.
loans, insurances, and mortgages. This process consumes a large amount of time, money, and human resources. Consider the example of a loan or an insurance application. The applicants are usually required to provide numerous documents to certify their relevant personal information, such as birth certificate, statement of monthly income, marriage certificate, medical records, and so on. At the same time, the loan/insurance provider requires a considerable amount of human resource to verify and store these documents. This process can take several weeks to complete, and serves to limit business throughput.
Moreover, the process of physical document verification incurs a critical privacy risk for applicants. They provide to a third party (i.e. the service provider) many sensitive documents, such as birth certificates, IDs, health records, and so on. All these documents are stored in the provider's database. If the client applies for multiple schemes or subscriptions, multiple copies of his/her personal data are stored in different places. Since data can be leaked from the server, storing personal information in multiple third-party databases is not recommended. One source of such a leak is employees who do not follow the company's privacy policies, and may, intentionally or unintentionally, reveal sensitive client information. Even when the provider claims to enforce strict policies pertaining to privacy, there is still a chance that the database systems are vulnerable to malicious external attacks.
In this paper, we propose a systematic approach to address the abovementioned shortcomings of the current state of the process of physical document verification. We assume that there is a trusted data source that stores the certified personal information of clients. We also assume that a list of requirements (maybe involving the divulgence of private information) needs to be fulfilled by the applicant to qualify for a given scheme or subscription. We present a series of protocols that allow the verifier and the data keeper to communicate with each other and securely verify the applicant's information according to the requirements proposed by the verifier. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) The proposed system digitalizes the process of document verification and hence enhances business throughput.
2) The system protects user confidentiality from both the verifier and the data keeper. The details of the requirements proposed by the verifier also remain hidden from the data keeper.
3) The proposed approach creates space for new services for information data storage and verification.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: In the next section, we review related work in the literature. Section 3 contains our problem formulation as well as the scenario we consider. Section 4 contains a discussion of our security model and assumptions as well as the underlying cryptographic techniques we leverage (i.e. Paillier's encryption scheme). The proposed solution to the problem of secure personal information verification is described in Section 5, which systematically discusses four stages of the solution. Section 6 presents experimental evaluations of the proposed sub-protocols. The final section discusses future work and our conclusions.
Related Work
The scenario we consider shares characteristics with the problem of zeroknowledge proof. Zero-knowledge proof systems, introduced by Goldwasser et al. [1] , involve two parties-a prover and a verifier. The system allows the prover to convince the verifier of some fact without revealing information about the proof. In our proposed problem, a client has to prove that he/she poses several attributes that match the requirements provided by the verifier. Zero-knowledge proof systems have been well researched, and have a wide range of applications, including authentication [2] , voting [3] , and e-cash [4] . J. Camenisch [5] proposed a useful zero-knowledge proof scheme which allows the prover to convince the verifier that a digitally committed value is a member of a given public set. The scheme can be directly applied to our problem. The client is assigned a number of digital commitments for each attribute, such that he/she can prove that the commitments belong to certain public sets. However, a separate instance of proof and verification is needed for each independent verifier; and every time the client's attribute changes, he/she needs to be assigned a new commitment from a trusted server. Moreover, the scheme only presents solutions for simple membership and range predicates. In order to provide an efficient solution to the problem of personal information verification, where the predicates are much more complicated, we need to consider different approaches.
Another approach to consider is private set intersection [6] [7] . It allows the verifier to determine whether an applicant satisfies the relevant requirements given a threshold. However, this approach can only deal with exact attribute matching. Moreover, without a trusted party verifying the set of attributes, the applicant can use false information.
While sharing similar purposes as the above approaches, our system considers a different setting in the context of zero-knowledge proof systems. The communication and verification processes are conducted by a verifier and a semi-honest data keeper, rather than by a verifier and a client. Our approach leverages the computation model of secure multi-party computation introduced by C. Yao [8] .
Many follow-up studies have addressed different problems in this context. Some sub-protocols presented in this paper are inspired by [9] and modify [10] using studies along this line of research.
Problem Formulation
Definitions. Our proposed system involves three general parties-the client, the verifier, and the data keeper-as illustrated in Figure 1 .
• The client. The client wishes to privately prove that his/her personal data satisfy the predicates predefined by the verifier.
• The verifier. The verifier (we call the verifier Bob) provides a series of predicates that need to be satisfied by the client. • The data keeper. The data keeper (whom we call Alice) stores the personal data of the client and provides a security guarantee for the data storage.
The database stored by the data keeper consists of n records. Each record describes a client by m attributes. Table 1 presents a simple example of data content maintained by the data keeper.
A personal information verification scheme is a Boolean function on a data record. The Boolean function is informally described by single and complex predicates. We assume that the single predicates are equality, inequality, membership, and non-membership.
• An equality predicate examines whether a variable x is equal to a certain value a:
• An inequality predicate inputs a variable x and a certain value a, and outputs 1 when He/She wants to prove that he/she qualifies for the scheme, but does not want to reveal exact information. At the same time, he/she also wishes to hide the fact that he/she is applying the certain scheme through others (such as Alice).
He/She should anonymously authenticate Bob to communicate with Alice. Bob interacts with Alice by our proposed approach. Finally, Bob should be able to decide whether the client qualifies for the given scheme.
Background

Security Assumptions
In this paper, the privacy/security of the proposed protocols is measured by the amount of information disclosed during execution. We adopt the security definitions and proof techniques from the literature on secure multi-party computation to analyse. The secure multi-party computation problem involves multiple parties collaboratively performing various types of computation without compromising the privacy of data. In the mid 1980s, C. Yao [8] There are two common adversarial models under secure multi-party computation: semi-honest and malicious. In the malicious model, the adversary has the ability to arbitrarily deviate from the protocol specifications. On the other hand, in the semi-honest model, an attacker (i.e. one of the participating parties) is expected to follow the prescribed steps of the protocol. However, the attacker is subsequently free to compute additional information based on his or her private input, output and messages received during the execution of the secure protocol.
Although the assumptions of the semi-honest adversarial model are weaker than those of the malicious model, we insist that this assumption is realistic under the problem settings. We assume that the data keepers are trusted (as they are governmental agencies) to ensure the confidentiality of sensitive client data. It is difficult to imagine them colluding with other companies to damage their own reputation. Moreover, it is often non-trivial for one party to maliciously deviate from a particular protocol which may be hidden in a complex process.
In short, we assume that the verifier and the data keeper are semi-honest.
They will correctly follow the protocol specifications. However, at the same time, they are also curious about the applicants' information. In general, secure personal information as described in Section 5 should meet the following privacy requirements:
• Client-to-verifier privacy. The verifier should not be able to gain any details concerning the client's personal data stored in the data keeper's database, except for those he can learn from the result (i.e. the client qualifies or not).
• Client-to-data-keeper privacy. At any point during protocol execution, the identity of the applicant should not be revealed to the data keeper.
• End user's privacy. The verifier should not be able to obtain any information relating to other clients stored in the data keeper's database.
• Verifier-to-data-keeper privacy. The details of the predicates should not be leaked to the data keeper. This requirement is particularly applicable to private services where the selection criteria may be private to the provider.
Additive Homomorphic Encryption
An additive homomorphic encryption scheme is a cryptosystem that allows arithmetic (i.e. addition) operations to be performed on the ciphertext without decryption or knowing the actual values. Efficient additive homomorphic cryptosystems have been proposed, such as the Pallier cryptosystem [11] , or the Damgard and Jurik cryptosystems [12] , which are Paillier encryption scheme of flexible lengths. For simplicity, we assume that a Paillier cryptosystem is used for encryption and decryption throughout this paper.
The Paillier cryptosystem consists of three algorithms:
: Inputs a security parameter and produces the key pair ( )
Inputs a public key pk and a message m, and outputs a ciphertext c. 
. Enc m Enc m
Enc m m × = +
• Homomorphic Multiplication:
• Semantic Security: Informally, a semantically secure [13] encryption scheme is a probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm such that given the ciphertext, an adversary cannot deduce any additional information about the plaintext.
The above computation is performed modulo 2 N . We refer the reader to [11] for more details. We also note that any additive homomorphic encryption scheme that satisfies the above properties can be utilized to implement our proposed framework.
Secure Information Verification
Overview
Our proposed approach to the secure information verification problem consists of four stages:
1) Setup-During this phase, the client goes through an anonymous authentication process so that the verifier is authenticated to communicate with the data keepers for the verification stage. In addition, the data keeper and the verifier generate an encryption key pair and exchange the public key of the homomorphic cryptosystem. These public keypairs are utilized for secure communication and computation at the later stages.
2) Single Predicate-In this stage, the data consumer evaluates a predicate for each entity in the dataset of the data keeper. The output of this stage is the encryption of either 1 or 0, depending on whether the entity satisfies the predicate.
3) Secure Complex Predicate Evaluation-Based on the results of the previous stage, the verifier collaborates with the data keeper to compute the result of the complex logical combination of Boolean predicates. Again, the output of this stage is the encryption of either 1 or 0 depending on whether the entity satisfies the predicate.
4) Aggregation of Output Data-At this stage, the final result is aggregated,
decrypted and shown to the verifier. Since the data keeper computes the decryption, we propose a secure protocol to generate the outcome so that the data keeper cannot obtain any information concerning the final result.
Setup
In the setup phase, the client is first required to complete anonymous authentication with the data keeper Alice, who then allows the verifier Bob to initiate the secure information verification process on the records of Alice's database.
When the clients agree to their personal information being stored in Alice's database, she issues to each client a credential to be used for authentication. Each time a client subsequently requests access to Alice's database, he/she uses her credentials for verification with Alice, who begins communication with Bob for the information verification process.
Traditional password-based authentication systems expose the identity of the client to the data keeper Alice. Hence, they violate the client-to-data-keeper privacy requirement. To satisfy this, it is desirable to have an authentication scheme that promises unlinkability, i.e. the server should not be able to link user requests such that access to the same user cannot be recognised as such.
As the anonymous authentication process is not our main contribution here, we only briefly review possible approaches to satisfy this requirement. The most feasible solution is anonymous credentials introduced by D. Chaum [14] . This allows a user to prove that he/she has obtained a credential issued by an organisation without revealing anything regarding his/her identity other than the credential. J. Camenisch [15] proposed a protocol that allows an organisation to issue a credential by obtaining a signature on a committed value. The client can then prove with zero knowledge that she has a signature under the organisation's public key on the given value.
Applied to our problem setting, the client first generates a non-interactive 
Single Individual Predicate Evaluation
In the single predicate evaluation stage, for each data record and each attribute that needs to be verified, the verifier Bob and the data keeper Alice together perform one of the following protocols: equality predicate evaluation, inequality predicate evaluation and (non-) membership predicate evaluation. The output of each protocol is an encrypted bit maintained by Bob. The resulting bit is encrypted under the data keeper's public key so that Bob cannot obtain any information relating to the other entities in the database. We now describe the three protocols to securely evaluate the results of these predicates.
Equality Predicate
A secure equality predicate evaluation tests whether two private inputs x and y are equal:
We use the protocol presented by C. Gentry et al. [10] to develop the protocol for secure equality predicate evaluation. Gentry's equal-tozero protocol [10] allows the comparison between a private value and zero. To be able to apply the equal-to-zero protocol, we execute a transformation (as presented in Protocol 1) on the two private inputs.
The computation in Steps 1 -2 transforms the problem into a secure equal-to-zero protocol. In this protocol, Alice holds an encrypted message with value a. The message is encrypted under Bob's key; hence, neither Alice nor Bob has information concerning the value a. The remaining part of the protocol involves compare a with 0. In the last step, Bob is required to compute an AND operator on the ciphertext space. In binary setting, the AND operator is exactly a multiplication scheme. We describe a secure multiplication scheme as in 
Enc r Enc r 
. Hence, no more information is leaked to either party. and N is the group size of the plaintext of the employed encryption scheme.
Inequality Predicate
Fischlin [17] and Blake [9] reduced the complexity of the solutions to
We propose a variant of Blake's protocol [9] as a building block to compare two private inputs. In our problem setting, at this stage, it is expected that no information relating to the results of the evaluation are known to the verifier or the data keeper. Therefore, we cannot directly apply the protocol proposed by Blake [9] , as it leaks the comparison results to one of the parties. In order to prevent such information leakage, we propose a mechanism, as an extension to the original scheme [9] as shown in Protocol 3. We now prove the security of the protocol. Due to the universal security of the secure equality evaluation protocol, we only need to consider the first part (i.e. Steps 1 -3). Privacy for Alice trivially holds because of the semantic security properties of the employed encryption scheme-the Paillier cryptosystem. Bob only receives from Alice a list of encryption messages, and obtains no more information about Alice's private input.
Bob's privacy against the semi-honest party Alice is proven by constructing a simulator 
(Non-) Membership Predicate
A membership predicate allows the verifier to examine whether an attribute of the client falls into certain categories. A simple example is the case where the verifier wishes to know if an applicant works in the education industry (e.g. teacher, student, librarian, school counsellor, etc.). A non-membership predicate is the complement of the membership query, and tests whether a particular value is excluded from a set.
The membership predicate evaluation protocol is presented in Protocol 4. The non-membership predicate can be easily derived from Protocol 4 by applying the NOT operator discussed in Section 5.4.
In the protocol, Alice is required to evaluate the encrypted polynomial ( )
P x
at point x a = (line 3). She can do so due to the homomorphism of the cryptosystem. She first computes 
Complex Predicate Evaluation
At this stage, Bob holds the encrypted result of the evaluation for each data record, with each attribute in a complex predicate that needs to be verified. This sub-section discusses three basic primitives that operate on the encrypted inputs at this stage. With these primitives, Bob has the capability to compute the results of the encryption of the desired bit to evaluate each data record. The output of this stage is an encrypted bit for each data record. This bit indicates whether the given record satisfies the complex statement.
The inputs of the three primitives are either one encrypted bit (NOT operation) or two encrypted bits (AND and OR operations). They are described as follows:
1) ¬ (NOT)-It is easy to derive the formula for bit negation operation:
Enc x Enc
Enc x ¬ = − . Clearly, the operation leaks no information regarding the encrypted bit x to either Alice or Bob. It requires one exponentiation operation and one multiplication operation. Alice receives no more data, whereas
Bob only works on his inputs, which are encrypted data.
2) ∧ (AND)-Because x y x y ∧ = × for any two bits , x y , the primitive is identical to the description of SecMul (Protocol 2). The protocol requires five multiplication operations and five exponentiation operations in ciphertext space.
The security of the protocol follows the analysis of secure multiplication (i.e.
Protocol 2). 
Aggregation of Output Data
As the input of this stage, for each entity in Alice's database, Bob holds an encrypted bit that determines whether the data record qualifies the complex statement. In order to ensure there is exactly one qualified data record in case the application is successful, we introduce one special attribute to the final complex predicate. The attribute is the secret identification of the client in the database.
We assume that when the client registers his/her data with Alice the data keeper, Alice generates a secret random number c r to identify the client. The number is stored in the database as an attribute of the client. We introduce additional steps to address the requirement:
1) The client encrypts the random secret under Bob's key, obtain
Enc r .
2) The client anonymously sends the encryption of secret value to Alice.
3) Alice and Bob perform secure equality evaluation (starting from step 2) and get the result Finally, Bob is able to decide the result of the verification process by bit s.
Discussion
We first consider the security of the entire system, since all intermediate results The second issue we consider is the practical implementation of the system.
Since the same procedure is applied for all the data entries, the verification results for each data record can be computed in parallel. That means we are able to construct multiple verification threads, each one is corresponding to one data entry. By the batch verification approach, we can improve the running time of the whole process by a factor of n/m, where n is the number of data records and m is the number of threads.
While the same procedure is applied for each data record, the data keeper is not able to know who is the applicant. In practice, there are some cases that the data keeper (e.g. a governmental agency) is allowed to know the identity of the applicant, where this rigorous security feature is then not required. The proposed solution can be modified, and inherently improves performance.
Specifically, the client can perform a simple authentication rather than an anonymous solution to allow the verifier to communicate with the data keeper.
The verification process only needs to be performed on the only one data record identified by the client. Hence, the cost of the proposed solution is reduced by a factor of n where n is the number of data records in the data keeper's database.
In our proposed solution, an applicant qualifies only if he/she satisfies all criteria specified by a single predicate or complex predicates. Hence, we can define a complex predicate to cover all criteria using the AND operation. We also can extend our protocol to adapt to threshold criteria, where the applicant qualifies only if he/she satisfies more than k criteria. The idea is to compute the sum of each predicates evaluation (in encrypted form) and apply a slightly modified version of Protocol 3 to compare the encrypted value with threshold k.
Implementation
We implemented our proposed method, and calculated the CPU time required to run our sub-protocols from Section 5. Our experiments were conducted on a Windows 10.0 machine with a 3-GHz processor and 16 GB of RAM. We used the Paillier cryptosystem as the underlying additive homomorphic encryption scheme and implemented the proposed sub-protocols in Java.
We first examined the operation of the secure equality evaluation and the secure inequality evaluation protocols. Two factors affect the performance of these protocols: the Paillier key size and the domain size of the input. Table 2 shows the processing times of Protocols 1 & 3 with different settings of bit size and key size. We performed the experiment with bit lengths of 32, 64 and 160.
The latter was the size of the output of the SHA-1 hash function we used for the secret identification described in Section 5.5. The result showed that these protocols require twice the time for double-bit size of inputs; the time needed increased by a factor of nearly 7 when the Paillier key size was doubled.
The third single-predicate evaluation building block was the (non-) membership predicate. The run time of the building block depends on three factor: the Paillier key size, the number of elements in the set and the bit size of the inputs, where bit size only affects the final step of Protocol 4, which is the secure equality evaluation protocol. Figure 2 show the relationship between the run times of the two remaining factors and the performance of the building block.
We had made a similar observation earlier: the cost of the secure membership evaluation protocol when the key size was 1024 bits was roughly six to seven times more efficient than with a length of 2048 bits for the Paillier key. The computational cost of the protocol also increased linearly with the size of the set. Finally, the run time of the three protocols that evaluated the Boolean functions are shown in Table 3 . The same characteristics concerning the effect of the Paillier key size held for these building blocks.
In order to verify the feasibility of the whole proposed system, we conducted an experiment on a simulated dataset. We consider a complex statement verification comprising of 10 single predicates linking together by two boolean operations AND, OR. The running time for verifying single data record was 25 seconds, and it took approximately 1 hour to verify one thousand data record in the parallel mode of 10 threads running simultaneously.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a framework for privacy-preserving verification of personal information. We used the secure multi-party computation model and homomorphic encryption to develop a systematic solution to the problem in four stages. We showed that the proposed scheme can protect the clients privacy from both the verifier and the data keeper, and at the same time provides privacy to the former. Different ways to further enhance the performance of the proposed method and a scheme extension for threshold verification were discussed. The experimental results highlighted the efficiency and feasibility of our proposed scheme under different security settings.
